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In times of limited budgets and numerous challenges, any investment decision needs to be taken with care. This briefing outlines the long-term benefits of investing in climate resilience. It presents the costs of enhancing resilience in some of Europe’s most climate-vulnerable sectors and describes the benefits for EU’s economy and society.

Key messages

Agriculture, energy and transport are among the sectors most vulnerable to climate change (EEA, 2023a; Figure 3). Making these sectors climate resilient may require estimated investments of between EUR 53bn and 137bn annually by 2050 and a further EUR 59-173bn annually by 2100 depending on the climate emissions scenario. Current committed funding levels are estimated at just EUR 15-16bn per year for these sectors (Neumann, T. et al. (2026)).

Climate adaptation and resilience support Europe’s competitiveness, security and innovation. Well-chosen adaptation measures can unlock economic potential and generate societal benefits  on top of avoiding economic losses.

For climate adaptation and resilience to be most effective it must happen early – and ideally now – in order to support also climate mitigation efforts.

Box 1. Caveats of the figures presented below

All figures presented in this briefing based on Neumann, T. et al. (2026). They are best estimates based on available and harmonised data across Europe and are subject to uncertainties. This is particularly notable for estimates of the costs of adaptation, current adaptation funding levels and the adaptation funding gap. The reasons are as follows:

  • Estimating adaptation costs relies on several assumptions and parameter choices (the climate scenario, hazards covered, etc.).

  • Estimates stem from a variety of sources and methodological approaches requiring conversions to increase comparability. This however also leads to greater uncertainty in the estimates.

  • Not all potential impacts could be included. Neumann, T. et al. (2026) did not consider biodiversity loss or potential (socioeconomic) tipping points.

  • It was particularly difficult to delineate current funding levels between that dedicated to mitigation and that to adaptation. Despite best efforts, this may have led to some double-counting or omissions.

  • Due to the lack of available data on private financing for climate adaptation, these figures may be underestimated.

Costs of adaptation for agriculture, energy and transport

For a long time, climate adaptation received relatively little attention in climate change discussions, which were dominated by efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The rising frequency and severity of climate-related disasters, however, has pushed adaptation higher up the policy agenda and contributed to a broader shift in public perception. In a 2024 survey conducted by the European Investment Bank (EIB, 2024), 94% of EU respondents recognised the importance of adapting to climate change, while 50% indicated that adaptation should be prioritised. Climate adaptation cannot substitute climate mitigation, even though certain measures can bring co-benefits to mitigation. Early and proactive adaptation measures are crucial for reducing risks and preventing losses, particularly in the medium term. Timely action can strengthen resilience, lower future costs and help communities better cope with climate impacts.

In the long term, the potential of adaptation may be limited or goals may be achieved only at very high costs. For example, estimates suggest that the annual investment would need to double for a temperature rise from 1.5°C to 2°C above pre-industrial levels. For an increase to 3°C, it could roughly quadruple (COACCH, 2021; JRC, 2022). Beyond rising temperatures, this reflects increased weather variability as well as more frequent and intense extreme events. To avoid a large share of future economic losses, investing in climate adaptation is most effective now (along with continuing mitigation efforts).

The estimated costs of adaptation for all three sectors range between approximately EUR 53bn and 137bn per year until 2050 and EUR 59-173bn annually between 2051 and 2100. These numbers represent the lower and upper ranges of the estimates and depend on the time horizon and climate scenario (moderate vs high emissions). In view of the current pace of climate change and global mitigation efforts, this analysis focuses on medium and high emissions scenarios. For further details on the methodology, please refer to Box 3 below.

For comparison, the EU experienced annual economic losses of around EUR 40-50 bn per year between 2021 and 2024 due to extreme weather events, totalling EU 822bn over the period 1980-2024 (EEA, 2025a). In fact, the years 2021-2024 represented the top five highest annual economic losses since 1980. As those figures account for direct losses only, the sum of total costs will be higher. Moreover, severe weather- and climate-related extreme events are expected to intensify, driving further economic losses.

Table 1. Estimated costs of adaptation

Type

Annual estimates until 2050 under moderate emissions scenario

 

Annual estimates until 2100 under moderate emissions scenario

 

Annual estimates until 2050 under high emissions scenario

 

Annual estimates until 2100 under high emissions scenario

 
 

Lower

Upper

Lower

Upper

Lower

Upper

Lower

Upper

Transport

7

8

9

10

11

20

13

25

Energy

39

40

43

51

59

100

65

127

Agriculture

7

8

7

9

11

17

11

21

Total

53

56

59

70

81

137

89

173

Note: All figures in EUR bn.

Source: Neumann, T. et al. (2026)

As explained above, the costs of adaptation (i.e. estimated finance needs to plan, implement and maintain measures aimed at reducing vulnerability to climate change impacts) depend on the success of global climate mitigation efforts. In other words, the slower, more moderate the climate warming, the lower the costs to adapt to the ‘new normal’.

However, the reverse is also true: research highlights that investment in climate adaptation can also generate benefits for climate mitigation, creating a so-called ‘double dividend.

Benefits of climate adaptation

While the costs of investing in adaptation may seem high, increasing adaptive capacity will bring greater benefits to the economy and society overall. However, to make well-informed choices about individual climate adaptation measures, it is important to consider both costs and benefits. EEA (2023b) discusses in detail the methods to be used when deciding on climate adaptation measures.

When discussing and assessing the benefits of climate adaptation, two separate concepts are relevant. First, in this context the refers to the idea that well-designed investments in climate adaptation can generate two types of benefits at once:

  • Reducing climate risks (adaptation dividend). Investments protect people, infrastructure and economies from the damages caused by extreme weather, sea-level rise and other climate impacts.
  • Cutting greenhouse gas emissions or boosting sustainability (mitigation dividend). Many adaptation measures also reduce greenhouse gas emissions or support long- term climate goals.

The following non-exhaustive list of examples illustrates how different adaptation measures can also benefit mitigation:

  • Nature-based solutions: restoring wetlands both protects against floods and stores CO2.
  • Resilient agriculture: improved soil management, agroforestry and the use of drought-resilient crops increase resilience to droughts and heat extremes, safeguarding food production and farmer incomes. Measures also enhance carbon sequestration and reduce GHG emissions from farming.
  • Sustainable transport and infrastructure: flood- and heat-resilient roads, bridges and rail lines reduce damage and avoid emissions from reconstruction. Electrified and expanded public transport shifts travel away from fossil fuels. Green infrastructure and urban shading help manage flooding and heat, while lowering energy demand. Smart traffic systems maintain traffic flow during extreme weather, cutting congestion and fuel use.
  • Energy-efficient and climate-resilient buildings: upgrading buildings for heatwaves or storms often includes better insulation and ventilation. Measures cut energy use and reduce emissions while protecting health and productivity.
  • Resilient energy storage and distribution: smart grids use sensors and advanced controls to optimise energy use in real time enabling greater integration of renewable energy, while enhancing system resilience. Energy storage solutions further buffer variability in supply and protect against disruptions.

Second, the ‘triple dividend of resilienceconcept aims to broaden the scope of disaster risk management (DRM) and emphasises open thinking when considering benefits from climate adaptation. The framework identifies three ‘dividends’ as sources of benefits.

Figures 1 and 2 below visualise these different types of benefits give examples from the European context.

Figure 1. The ‘Triple Dividend’ concept

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Figure 2. Examples of the ‘triple dividends’ in adaptation measures in the EU

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The benefits of climate adaptation are long-term in nature and challenging to quantify. Yet they should be considered when making decisions about climate adaptation measures. Not only can the dividends be seen as separate categories; what is more, they reinforce each other.

Several global and European studies sought to express the benefits of climate adaptation in terms of returns per one euro invested. Notably, PESETA IV (JRC, 2022) concludes that adapting to rising coastal flood risks in the EU would deliver EUR 6 per every euro invested.

On a global level, a recent study (WRI, 2025) of 320 adaptation investments in 12 (non-European) countries concluded that every US dollar invested in adaptation may bring over USD 10.50 in benefits over a 10-year period and yield average returns of 27% per project. Moreover, the average values of second and third dividends were double those of avoided losses. The viability of many adaptation investments were not even dependent on the anticipated disaster occurring. Almost half of the evaluated adaptation investments yielded mitigation co-benefits, reinforcing potential synergies with mitigation activities.

Current funding for climate adaptation for agriculture, energy and transport

Different funding sources exist for climate adaptation and enhancing climate resilience. First, funding is provided by the public sector at EU, national and local levels. The private sector also provides funding to a much lesser degree. In practice, there is growing evidence of so-called blended finance involving various forms of public-private partnerships. For example, as certain projects may be deemed too risky or returns too slow for the private sector, the public sector may offer other incentives (e.g. a guarantee to bear the first losses). For an overview of different sources at EU level, please refer to Climate-ADAPT. The table below provides an overview of estimated funding in 2025 from various sources.

Table 2. Estimated funding for climate adaptation in 2025

Sector

EU-Level funds

Sub-national budgets

Private finance

Total (All sources, average)

Transport

2.0-2.5

1.30

0.05-0.06

3.35-3.85

Energy

1.5-1.6

0.83

0.03-0.04

2.36-2.47

Agriculture

5.3-5.7

3.00

1.00-1.10

9.30-9.80

Total

8.8-9.8

5.10

1.10

15.00-16.10

Note: All figures in EUR bn. Calculations may be conservative due to data unavailability, particularly estimates of private finance in energy and agriculture.
Estimates may be conservative. For example, the Platform on sustainable finance estimated current funding to be EUR 29bn annually (EC, 2025)

Source: Neumann, T. et al. (2026).

The adaptation funding gap is calculated as the difference between funding needs and funds committed.

Current adaptation funding for EU transport and energy sectors is between EUR 3.35-3.85bn and 2.36-2.47bn, respectively. A significant adaptation funding gap exists for both sectors, which escalates under more severe climate scenarios and over longer time horizons.

For agriculture, current funding is estimated at EUR 9.3-9.8bn annually. This estimation reveals a notable funding gap under the high emissions scenario that widens over time. While the latest estimates suggest the funding situation may not be concerning under the moderate scenario for shorter time horizons, the European Climate Risk Assessment (EUCRA) concludes that the agriculture sector is not yet sufficiently resilient (EEA, 2024). In particular, no other sector may be as exposed to the negative impacts of extreme weather events (such as heatwaves and droughts, heavy rain and floods). Furthermore, there are large region-specific differences across Europe, with southern Europe most affected

The combined current annual funding gap for all three sectors is estimated to range from a deficit of EUR 39bn to EUR 120bn under the moderate and high emissions scenario respectively up to 2050. This grows to between EUR 44bn and EUR 157bn until 2100, depending on the scenario.

Figure 3. Current estimated annual funding gap in 2025

EU strategic focus: climate resilience strengthens competitiveness, security and innovation

The impacts of climate change should not be considered in isolation. They are tied closely to other European challenges, including food security and competitiveness. Recent shocks such as international trade tariffs and the war in Ukraine have added further pressure to long-standing structural problems.

To address these challenges, the European Commission presented several key documents in 2025, including the Competitiveness Compass, the Clean Industrial Deal, the Vision for Agriculture and Food, the Affordable Energy Action Plan, the Strategic Foresight Report on ‘Resilience 2.0’ and the European Preparedness Union Strategy. The latter draws particular attention to the links between climate and security. Its goal is to help Member States and the EU more broadly anticipate and better respond to emerging threats. This strategy sets out 30 initiatives and an action plan, with a strong focus on resilience to climate risks and environmental pressures. Importantly, it tasks the European Commission with developing a dedicated European climate resilience and risk management - integrated framework to strengthen preparedness and climate resilience across the EU. Further details are expected in 2026.

Three reports published in 2024 provided the foundation for the proposals above (see Figure 4).

Figure 4. Key contents of the Draghi, Letta and Niinistö reports from 2024

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All three reports agree that climate change is a defining threat to Europe’s security, prosperity and wellbeing. The Draghi report emphasises that ‘priorities, such as climate adaptation and environmental protection, are likely to require significant additional investment’ (Draghi, 2024).

Box 2. Terminology

Adaptation

In essence, adaptation is the process of adjusting to the current and future effects of climate change. For further distinction between climate change adaptation and mitigation, please see the EEA FAQ on adaptation vs mitigation.

Climate resilience

Climate resilience is the ability to anticipate, prepare for, adapt to and recover from the impacts of climate change. It can be seen as the end goal of transformational adaptation.

Benefits of adaptation

The narrowest definition would consider these benefits as avoided losses (i.e. considering direct and indirect damage to infrastructure and assets and the avoided deaths and well-being losses).

However, climate adaptation and increasing resilience may also benefit mitigation (the so-called ‘double dividend’ concept) and may bring other additional co-benefits (‘triple dividends’).

Costs of adaptation

In general, the definitions and components of costs of adaptation may differ. In this briefing, the term 'costs of adaptation’ is used in the broad sense of climate adaptation finance or investment needs. Estimated adaptation finance needs include all expenditures necessary to plan, implement and maintain measures aimed at reducing vulnerability to climate change impacts. To derive the figures presented in this briefing, Neumann, T. et al. (2026) adopted a more comprehensive approach, which classifies the components into sub-categories (in line with I4CE, 2024):

  • Anticipation costs: costs of preventive work to improve and maintain resilience.
  • Reaction costs: costs of repairing damage after an extreme climate event.
  • Socio-economic costs: loss of revenue or other socio-economic consequences after an extreme climate event, for example.

Costs of inaction

Economic, social and environmental damages or losses that occur when adaptation measures are not implemented. These include both direct costs (physical damages) and indirect costs (economic losses and broader societal impacts).

Inaction

Failure to implement adaptation measures. This represents a scenario where no new or additional actions are taken beyond current policies or practices, resulting in increasing vulnerability and potential damages from climate change.

Incremental adaptation

Climate-proofing existing systems through gradual adjustments, maintaining the same basic structures and functions.

Neumann, T. et al. (2026) assumes incremental adaptation in the medium term (up to 2050) and mixed or transformational adaptation in the long term (between 2050 and 2100) to reflect typical policy planning horizons and realistic progression from current policies towards necessary transformative measures as climate impacts intensify.

Mixed adaptation

Mixed adaptation refers to a combination of adaptation approaches, for example integrating grey (technological/infrastructural), green (ecosystem-based) and soft (institutional/social) measures within a single adaptation strategy.

Transformational adaptation

Fundamental, systemic changes or rapid overhauls in anticipation of climate change.

Importantly, this means transforming systems in a way that reduces vulnerability when building climate resilience. Groups most affected by climate change generally have the least capacity to adapt, often being excluded from adaptation benefits. This reinforces existing inequalities, something transformational adaptation seeks to address.

Box 3. Methodology for calculating the costs of adaptation

The numbers presented above are based on the study by Neumann, T. et al. (2026). The approach follows that of I4CE (2024), which classifies costs of adaptation into several categories (anticipation costs; reaction costs and socio-economic costs).

Despite some differences in the methodology (i.e. the underlying analysis in Neumann, T. et al. (2026) includes to some degree also reaction costs and socio-economic effects as components of costs of adaptation), the results are in the same order of magnitude as the costs of climate adaptation estimated by the World Bank in 2024 based on an extrapolation of national studies (EUR 15 -64 bn annually by 2030, WB, 2024b) as well as the Platform on sustainable finance (EUR 77 bn annually by 2030).

A key prerogative was to use as many relevant findings from existing research as possible and upscale missing data to reach EU totals.

To derive the cost of adaptation for each Member State and sector, the study employed a bottom-up aggregation approach using the data from national studies. However, as studies differed in scope and assumptions, the project introduced a calibration step to harmonise these diverse inputs. In essence, each national study’s results were adjusted to a common set of reference assumptions, notably aligning them to consistent climate scenarios, adaptation ambition levels, hazards covered and time frames.

Once calibrated, results were aggregated and for countries where no suitable study was available, the team extrapolated values using proxy metrics, ensuring no Member State or sector was left out. This calibrated and extrapolated compilation yielded an approximate annual adaptation cost for each country in the transport, energy and agriculture sectors, under both a moderate emissions scenario and a high emissions scenario.

Calibration

Four key parameters were standardised during calibration:

  • climate change/emissions scenarios;
  • adaptation scenarios;
  • hazard coverage;
  • time horizons.

Climate change and emissions scenarios

Scenarios from all studies were calibrated into two:

  • a moderate emissions scenario;
  • a high-emissions, fossil fuel-intensive scenario.

These were chosen to capture a realistic range of potential future climate conditions. Namely, IPCCC and other sources urged that under current trajectories the 1.5°C target is likely to be exceeded; in other words, a moderate emissions scenario may not be realistic any more (see for example IPCC AR6 Working Group III Summary for Policymakers). The categorization used in EUCRA (EEA, 2024, p.74) was relied upon.

This provided a robust basis for comparing adaptation needs across different plausible climate futures and implied a need to scale up or down between scenarios. Studies under Paris-compliant scenarios were scaled when aligning to moderate and high emissions scenarios. This provided upper and lower ranges.

More details and concrete parameters used for scaling between scenarios are outlined in Neumann, T. et al. (2026).

Adaptation scenarios

A standardised adaptation assumption was chosen to reflect typical policy planning horizons and the realistic progression from current policies towards necessary transformative measures as climate impacts intensify (see e.g. Bloemen,P. et al. 2018). This assumed incremental adaptation in the medium term (up to 2050) and mixed or transformational adaptation in the long term (between 2050 and 2100).

Selecting incremental adaptation through to 2050 reflects the near-term focus of most national policies and pragmatic improvements that can be planned and financed within existing institutional frameworks, such as upgraded drainage, enhanced early-warning systems and revised building codes.

From the mid-century on, it is assumed that the scale and irreversibility of climate impacts will outstrip what incremental measures alone can address. Hence a shift to mixed or transformational adaptation between 2050 and 2100 is expected to be both necessary and inevitable.

Hazard coverage

In calibrating for hazard coverage, Neumann, T. et al. (2026) applied a scaling approach that accounts for the share of relevant climate hazards included in each national study. Rather than assuming equal importance across all hazards, the study weighted them according to their relative impact on each sector. Sector-specific proxy data were identified from the relevant literature. For the energy and transport sectors, Neumann, T. et al. (2026) drew on the study by Forzieri, G. et al. (2018), which assesses climate risk to certain sectors across Europe broken down by hazard.

More details and concrete parameters used for scaling between scenarios are outlined in Neumann, T. et al. (2026).

Time horizons

The analysis considered two time horizons: near to mid-term, by 2050 and long-term, by 2100.

For further methodological details and more detailed results, please refer to Neumann, T. et al. (2026).

Box 4. Methodology for the calculation of the current adaptation funding for energy, transport and agriculture

Figures presented in this briefing are based on the study by Neumann, T. et al. (2026). To derive estimates for current adaptation funding, the study adopted a top-down approach relying on public information about budget allocations and a series of assumptions. Adaptation resources are channelled through several principal sources: EU-level instruments (e.g. the multi-annual budget, recovery facilities, dedicated climate programmes and cohesion and rural-development funds); public financial institutions; national and sub-national budgets; and private sources.

For each funding source, the analysis attempted to isolate climate-relevant expenditure. Since in most cases climate finance is not broken down in adaptation or mitigation finance, ratios based on previous studies were applied to distinguish adaptation from mitigation expenditure. Also, since most sources do not specify the end-use sector, the study allocated their adaptation share to transport, energy and agriculture using weighting factors derived from prior programming experience and sectoral investment patterns.

The result is an order-of-magnitude view of the resources currently reaching adaptation in the three focus sectors.

For further methodological details and more detailed results, please refer to Neumann, T. et al. (2026).

This briefing is part of an ongoing series of EEA products that explore the costs and benefits of climate adaptation. Together, these products provide insight into the economics of climate resilience.

This analysis builds on the 2023 EEA briefing ‘Assessing the costs and benefits of climate change adaptation’ and draws on the EEA Indicator on Economic losses from weather- and climate-related extremes in Europe. Readers are encouraged to explore these complementary products as well as the case studies on Climate-ADAPT for a more in-depth understanding of the costs and benefits of adaptation measures in Europe.

EEA Briefing 18/2025:

Title: Making agriculture, energy and transport climate resilient: how much money is required and what will it deliver?

HTML: TH-01-25-042-EN-Q - ISBN: 978-92-9480-749-6 - ISSN: 2467-3196 - doi: 10.2800/8374479

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