

# The role of carbon dioxide removals in the 2040 target

'Earth observation for monitoring, reporting and verification of carbon removals' conference  
Copenhagen, 8-11 October 2024

François Dejean  
Head of Secretariat



# 1. The European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change

2. Advice on the EU's 2040 climate target
3. 'Towards EU climate neutrality': progress, policy gaps and opportunities
4. Upcoming advice on carbon dioxide removals

## The Advisory Board

*shall serve as a point of reference for the Union  
on scientific knowledge relating to climate change  
by virtue of its independence and scientific and technical expertise.*

European Climate Law (EU) 2021/1119

# The 15 Advisory Board members



**Ottmar Edenhofer**  
(Chair)

Technische Universität in Berlin



**Jette Bredahl Jacobsen**  
(Vice-Chair)

University of Copenhagen



**Laura Diaz Anadon**  
(Vice-Chair)

University of Cambridge



**Maarten Van Aalst**

University of Twente



**Constantinos Cartalis**

National and Kapodistrian  
University of Athens



**Suraje Dessai**

University of Leeds



**Vera Eory**

Scotland's Rural College



**Edgar Hertwich**

Norwegian University of Science  
and Technology in Trondheim



**Lena Kitzing**

Technical University of Denmark



**Elena Lopez-Gunn**

ICATALIST



**Lars J. Nilsson**

Lund University



**Keywan Riahi**

International Institute for Applied  
Systems Analysis



**Joeri Rogelj**

Grantham Institute of the  
Imperial College London



**Nicolaas Schrijver**

Leiden University



**Jean-François Soussana**

French National Research  
Institute for Agriculture, Food...


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
**Scientific advice for the  
determination of an EU-wide 2040  
climate target and a greenhouse  
gas budget for 2030–2050**

15 June 2023

# An EU 2040 target considering feasibility and fairness



# Using the latest scientific evidence to identify a range of feasible emission reductions in line with 1.5°C



➔ Feasible range for 2040: 88% to 95% net reductions vs 1990

# Assessing pathways' environmental risks from their reliance on CCUS, carbon removals and bioenergy use

	<b>Environmental risk level</b>
<b>Carbon capture, utilisation and storage</b>	425 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> annually by 2050
<b>Carbon removals from the land sink</b>	Net sink of 400 Mt CO <sub>2</sub> per year by 2050
<b>Bioenergy</b>	9 EJ of annual primary bioenergy use by 2050



# Feasibility: implied EU GHG emission budgets for 2030-2050 and 2040 reductions by different ranges of scenarios


Range of scenarios	Number of scenarios	Implied range for an EU budget for 2030-2050 (Gt CO <sub>2</sub> e)	Implied range for an EU 2040 reduction target (% reduction vs. 1990)
<b>Scenarios</b>	36	8-19	83-96%
within environmental risk levels (less reliance on CCUS, carbon removals from land, and bioenergy)	7	11-16	88-95%
within environmental risk levels <b>and</b> technological deployment challenge levels (less rapid scale-up of non-biomass renewables)	5	13-16	88-92%

# Considering various approaches to EU's fair share of the global carbon budget

## Approach                      Equity principle

<b>Grandfathering</b>	Sovereignty
<b>Immediate per capita convergence</b>	Equality
<b>Per capita convergence</b>	Sovereignty / equality
<b>Equal cumulative per capita emissions</b>	Equality / responsibility
<b>Ability to pay</b>	Capability / need
<b>Greenhouse development rights</b>	Responsibility / capability / need
<b>Cost-optimal</b>	Cost-effectiveness

## EU fair share carbon budget estimates from 2020




Source: Pelz et al. (2023)

Source: modified from Table 1 of Van den Berg et al. (2020)

# Feasibility and fairness


	2040 reduction	2030-2050 budget
<p><i>Range informed by <b>feasibility</b></i></p> <p>Noting that achieving the more ambitious end of this range implies challenging levels of energy technology scale-up</p>	88% <b>to 95%</b>	<b>11</b> to 16 Gt CO <sub>2</sub> e
<p><i>Minimum ambition informed by <b>fair share estimates</b></i></p> <p>Noting that emissions in the climate neutrality pathways exceed equity-based fair share estimates</p>	<b>At least 90%</b>	<b>Up to 14</b> Gt CO <sub>2</sub> e

# Recommended range of 2040 GHG reduction vs 1990



# Reconciling feasible and fair EU contributions to global climate change mitigation

Greenhouse gas emissions  
(2020-2050 cumulative) consistent  
with recommended target range



# Reconciling feasible and fair EU contributions to global climate change mitigation




# Reconciling feasible and fair EU contributions to global climate change mitigation




# Reconciling feasible and fair EU contributions to global climate change mitigation



# Reconciling feasible and fair EU contributions to global climate change mitigation




# The recommended range of emission reductions can be achieved in various ways – choices must be made




# Iconic pathways illustrating choices and strategies to achieve climate neutrality by 2050

## Demand-side focus pathway




- Less resource-intensive lifestyles
- Lowest final energy demand in 2040
- Lowest reliance on carbon removals (from CCS and the land sink combined) by 2050

## High renewable energy pathway



- Largest greenhouse gas budget
- High renewable energy deployment
- Highest deployment of non-biomass renewable energy
- Highest rate of electrification by 2040

## Mixed options pathway




- Lowest cumulative emissions in the 2030-2050 period
- Greatest deployment of carbon removals (with specific focus on sustainable land-based removals)
- Increase in the contribution of nuclear power over time (as opposed to the two other iconic pathways)

# The scenarios considered present common features regarding sectoral emission reductions

- **Decarbonisation of the power sector:**
  - Share of electricity in final energy demand doubles
  - 70-90% wind, solar, hydro
  - Coal almost phased out by 2030, natural gas by 2040
  - Scale-up of bioenergy and hydrogen varies between scenarios
- **Reduction of total energy demand** by 20% to 40% compared to today, with significant reductions in transport, industry and residential/tertiary sectors
- **Reduction of non-CO<sub>2</sub> emissions** by 20% and 60% compared to today, with significant reduction in agriculture, energy and waste sectors
- **Scale up of carbon removals**, estimated to represent between 146 and 614 Mt CO<sub>2</sub> in 2040
  - Land sink limited by climate impacts, estimated between 100 and 400 Mt CO<sub>2</sub> in 2040
  - BECCS+DACCS between 46 and 214 Mt CO<sub>2</sub> in 2040

# 2040 scenarios bring carbon dioxide removals at scale



**Net removals from LULUCF, BECCS and DACCS in the 36 filtered scenarios**

# All the scenarios analysed require large-scale deployment of carbon removals by 2050

- Each scenario places a different emphasis on
  - the need for carbon removals
  - the extent to which its deployment is through the **enhancement of the sink** or **technologies such as BECCS**
- However, both sources are required, and both have important benefits and risks
- **Increasing the land sink** requires changes in land use and management practices, as well as resilience to climate change impacts
- **Scaling up other carbon removals technologies** requires **investment in new capacity** and **overcoming barriers** such as:
  - absence of market incentives and governance challenges
  - technological, social and environmental barriers that remain largely unexplored
- Significant **uncertainties** in scenarios regarding the **potential of emissions reductions**, and the **potential of removals**, especially from novel methods

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


## **Towards EU climate neutrality**


Progress, policy gaps and opportunities

Assessment Report 2024  
18 January 2024


# Current progress: pace of reductions needs to double up to 2030, and increase further post-2030



# 'Towards EU climate neutrality: Progress, policy gaps and opportunities' (January 2024)



# Reversing the decrease in the LULUCF carbon sink



- Harvested Wood Products
- Settlements and other land
- Wetlands
- Grassland
- Cropland
- Forest land
- Total
- 2030 benchmark
- 2050 benchmark
- 2040 advice scenarios

Source: ESABCC (2024), *Towards EU climate neutrality: progress, policy gaps and opportunities*

# Policy recommendations to reverse the decrease in the LULUCF carbon sink




## 1. Maintain and expand forests and wetland areas

→ To be better reflected in EU agriculture and bioenergy policies


## 2. Increase the carbon sink in existing forests

- Better target incentives for bioenergy use towards sectors with limited alternatives
- Start preparations to introduce GHG pricing in the LULUCF sector (financial incentive for forest managers to reduce emissions and increase removals)




## 3. Reduce GHG emissions and increase removals in crop- and grasslands

→ Provide stronger incentives for GHG reductions and carbon removals



## 4. Improve the resilience of ecosystems to current and projected climate change impacts

- Increase efforts on adaptation
- Develop a contingency strategy




# Recommendations on CCU/CCS

- CCU/CCS is limited by its capital intensity and impacts on energy system.  
The value chain is **not yet mature**
- **Residual emissions** are not defined / no standards
- **Techno-economic aspects** limit the availability/certainty/sustainability of CCU/CCS




- CCU/CCS should be targeted towards **activities with no/limited alternatives**, avoid unnecessary fossil gas **infrastructure lock-ins**
- **Energy efficiency 1<sup>st</sup> principle** should be systematically put into practice

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


# The EU is committed to net zero emission *by* 2050 and net-negative emissions thereafter




Example EU pathway ('High renewable energy'), Source: Advisory Board

# Challenge for EU policy: How to scale up removals sustainably?



# Diverse removal methods with specific risks and benefits



# The Advisory Board will provide the EU with scientific advice on carbon dioxide removals



# MRV remain the nuts and bolts of climate action – and for the scale up of carbon removals

- **MRV is critical for climate policy implementation and accounting towards targets**
- **Certification** forms the basis to deliver labels, allocate subsidies and trade credits
  - Accurate **quantification** of removals
  - True **additionality** and no overestimation (over-crediting risk)
  - Monitoring the real **duration of storage**, with long-term liability mechanisms
  - Providing information on side-effects (→ help manage land use, biomass sourcing, climate impacts and **sustainability**)
  - **Tailored** to different removal methods, including newer innovative methods
- MRV can benefit from **emerging technologies**
- Accuracy to be balanced with **costs** and administrative burden - including with an enhanced use of satellite data
- An **EU-wide governance of greenhouse gas removals** to efficient stakeholder coordination at different levels



QUANTIFICATION



ADDITIONALITY



LONG-TERM  
STORAGE



SUSTAINABILITY

# In conclusion...

1. In addition to strong incentives for **emission reductions, scaling up both land-based and technological removals** is needed for the EU to achieve its climate objectives
2. **Policy opportunities already exist** to protect and enhance EU's net carbon sink, and to support the deployment of novel technologies. However, **additional policy options remain necessary**
3. **Robust MRV is key** to monitoring progress, enforcing compliance, and enabling efficient implementation
4. Building an effective **governance of CDR** will require further **scientific insight and credible data**



francois.dejean@esabcc.europa.eu / secretariat.advisoryboard@esabcc.europa.eu



climate-advisory-board.europa.eu



@European Scientific Advisory Board on Climate Change



@esabcc\_eu